



# An Algorithm for Symmetric Cryptography with a wide range of scalability


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## Basic Concept for Symmetric Cryptography



### Characteristic:

The same key is used for encryption and decryption

## Basic Rules for efficient Cryptography are defined by Shannon:

### Confusion:

Goal: Hiding the relationship between message and encrypted message

Good: Any character in the plaintext-block is replaced by another character,  
but not always the same character

Bad: Any character in the plaintext-block is replaced by one corresponding character

### Diffusion:

Goal: Distribution of changes over the complete encrypted message

Good: If we change one bit of the *message*, all bits in the *encrypted message* may change


Bad: If we change one bit of the *message*, only one bit in the *encrypted message* will change

Good: If we change one bit of the *key*, all bits in the *encrypted message* may change

Bad: If we change one bit of the *key*, only one bit in the *encrypted message* will change




## Block diagram: Encrypting a message



- Actions:
1. Computing a 32 bit hashnumber, writing it to the head of the encrypted block and initialising the random-number generators 1 and 2 with this hashnumber
  2. Creating blocks of length MINBYTES to MAXBYTES
  3. Changing blocks by xor-operation with 32 bit pseudo-random-numbers from generator 1
  4. Byte exchange within blocks, dependent on pseudo-random-numbers from generator 2
  5. Joining all blocks to the encrypted block with length n+4

## Block diagram: Decrypting a message




- Actions:
1. Reading 32 Bit hashnumber and initialising random-number generators 1 and 2
  2. Creating blocks of length MINBYTES to MAXBYTES
  3. Byte exchange within blocks, dependent on pseudo-random-numbers from generator 2
  4. Changing blocks by xor-operation with 32 bit pseudo-random-numbers from generator 1
  5. Joining all blocks to the decrypted block


## This algorithm needs 2 random-number generators with a large period length

This has been realised by two generators-types:

generator-type random1



generator-type random2



## Algorithm of the pseudo random-number generator-type random1

Published by Donald E. Knuth: The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2

$$X(n+1) = ( aX(n) + c ) \text{ mod } m$$

**where**

a, c are large prime numbers

$$a \neq c, a < m$$

Suitable constants for a 32 bit random-number generator are:


$$a = 4294967279 = 2^{32} - 17$$

$$c = 715827883$$

$$m = 4294967296 = 2^{32}$$



## Algorithm of the pseudo random-number generator-type `random2` called **additive number generator**



Published by Donald E. Knuth: The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2

Originally developed by G.J. Mitchell and D.P. Moore

$$X(n) = ( X(n-24) + X(n-55) ) \bmod m$$

**where**


$X(0), \dots, X(54)$  are arbitrary integers not all even

$n \geq 55$


Array with integer numbers, values from 0 to  $m-1$

## Initialization of the array with 32 bit integer numbers

This is realised by generator-type **random1** :



## Implementation of the pseudo random-number generator random2 (additive number generator) as a C++ program



```
// Constants
#define KK 55
```


```
class randomnumber{
    // private members
    int j, k;
    u_long y[KK]; // Content of array determines the
                 // sequence of 32 Bit random-numbers
```

```
u_long randomnumber::random2( void )
{
    u_long i1;
    i1 = y[k] + y[j]; // Modulo 2^32 by overflow
    y[k] = i1;
    j--; k--;
    if ( k < 0 ) k = KK-1;
    if ( j < 0 ) j = KK-1;
    return i1;
}
```

32 bit numbers (u\_short), values from 0 to  $2^{32} - 1$

## Initialisation of the *additive number generator*

### 1. Filling the array "y" with pseudo random-numbers



```
void init_random1( u_long ix )
{
    int i;
    j=KJ-1; k=KK-1;
    //Initialization of the array with random-numbers
    for ( i=0; i < KK; i++){
        ix = random1( ix );
        y[i] = ix;
    }
}
```

Note: The hashnumber determined by the input-block is used as the start-value for the initialisation procedure.

Result: If we change one bit of the *message*, all bits in the *encrypted message* may change.




## Initialisation of the *additive number generator* (2)

### 2. Adding the key, byte by byte, to the array elements

```
void init_random2( char sx[] )
{
  int i, j;
  u_char *py;
  py = (u_char*)y;
  for ( i=0, j=0; i < KK; py++, i++, j++ ){
    if ( sx[j] == '\\0' ){
      j = -1;
      continue;
    }
    // Add key[j] to y-Buffer Modulo 2^8
    *py = *py + sx[j];
  }
}
```

### Byte Exchange



$n = \text{current blocklength} = \text{MINBYTES}.. \text{MAXBYTES}$

#### Rules

- ❖ The two bytes for exchange are determined by the random-number generator `random2`.
- ❖  $n/2$  bytes are exchanged;  $n/2$  bytes stays unchanged; therefore  $n/4$  exchange-operations are performed.
- ❖ Any byte will be exchanged only one times.

#### Program code (principle)

```
while (current_number_of_exchanges < n/4){
  i1 = random_number(); // next random-number
  i2 = random_number(); // next random-number
  byte_exchange(i1, i2);
}
```

## Scalability of the algorithm

- ❖ key-length from 4 to 220 bytes
- ❖ security levels from 1 to 7

The security level determines the value of `startloops`, used for initialization of the random-number generators 1 and 2:

security level	startloops	duration
1	200	10 $\mu$ s
2	2.000	100 $\mu$ s
3	20.000	1ms
4	200.000	10ms
5	2.000.000	100ms
6	20.000.000	1s
7	200.000.000	10s

The random-numbers generated during the warm-up-cycles are ignored.

## Goal of the warm-up-cycles (startloops)

Every warm-up-cycle needs at least:

- ❖ 2 integer additions of array elements
- ❖ 2 integer decrement operations
- ❖ 2 integer comparisons

The warm-up-cycles must be finished before encryption or decryption may start.

Only in this case the right pseudo random-number sequences from random-number generator 1 and 2 are available.

**Result:** This forced time-consumption makes it more difficult to break the key.

There are some requirements for security:

- ❖ There is no way to get the right pseudo random-number sequence without performing `startloops` warm-up-cycles
- ❖ Special hardware does not have a significantly higher speed than a CPU from Intel or AMD.





## Expense of cracking the key (1)

We assume that the attacker

- ❖ knows the exact algorithm for encryption/decryption
- ❖ is able to cause a known message to be encrypted with the searched key (called: chosen-plaintext-attack)
- ❖ tries to get the right key by attempting any possible key (called: brute-force-attack)

Further we assume that

- ❖ decryption of a (short) chosen message needs  $dt$  seconds
- ❖ warm-up-run needs  $wt$  seconds

Therefore any trial needs at least  $tt$  seconds.

$$\text{with } tt = dt + wt$$



## Expense of cracking the key (2)

Let us consider the worst case:

- ❖ key-length = 4 Byte, using only printable characters (95 characters)
- ❖  $dt = 10^{-5}$  s;  $wt = 10^{-5}$  s;  $tt = 2 \cdot 10^{-5}$  s

On the average  $95^4/2$  trials are needed to determine the right key.

The required time is:

$$t = 95^4/2 \cdot 2 \cdot 10^{-5} \text{ s}$$

$$t = 815 \text{ s}$$

**Result: Under these conditions it is easy to crack the key.**

## Expense of cracking the key (3)

Let us consider a further case:

- ❖ key-length = 4 Byte, using only printable characters (95 characters)
- ❖  $dt = 10^{-5} \text{ s}$ ;  $wt = 1 \text{ s}$ ;  $tt \approx 1 \text{ s}$

On the average  $95^4/2$  trials are needed to determine the right key.

The required time is:

$$t = 95^4/2 * 1 \text{ s}$$

$$t = 40725313 \text{ s}$$

$$t = 11313 \text{ h ( 1000 PCs would need 11.3h )}$$

**Result:**

**Under these conditions it is very difficult to crack even such a short key.**

## Expense of cracking the key under normal conditions

- ❖ key-length = 6 Byte, using only printable characters (95 characters)
- ❖ security level from 1 to 7
- ❖ brute-force-attack
- ❖ single PC with CPU AMD Athlon 1700+

security level	startloops	crack time (average)
1	200	85 days
2	2.000	468 days
3	20.000	4.296 days
4	200.000	117 years
5	2.000.000	1.166 years
6	20.000.000	11.654 years
7	200.000.000	116.548 years



## Features of the presented algorithm

- ❖ key-length from 4 to 220 bytes
- ❖ block-length from 16 to FILE\_LENGTH
- ❖ security levels from 1 to 7 by changing only one parameter
  - ☐ 1 = quick: encryption/decryption requires 10 $\mu$ s
  - ☐ 7 = slow: encryption/decryption requires 10s
- ❖ easy to understand
- ❖ no hidden features
- ❖ easy to implement on PC or workstation
- ❖ Encryption/Decryption speed;  
CPU=AMD Athlon 1700+; input- and output-file on harddisk :
  - ☐ Encryption: 2 MB/s
  - ☐ Decryption: 3 MB/s

**Note:** A large key-length makes it possible to choose a key which is easy to remember such as "My neighbors to the left are Frank&Mary"

## Possible weak-points of the algorithm

- ❖ A chosen plaintext attack may give sufficient information about the internal status of the pseudo random-number generator.
  - ➔ Result:  
The attacker may be able to predict the random-number sequence.
- ❖ The hashnumber stored in the encrypted block may give too much information about the plaintext.

## Future activities

- ❖ Examination of the weak-points.
- ❖ Finishing the C++ program
- ❖ Publishing the source code



## References

- ❖ Knuth, D. E.: The Art of Computer Programming.  
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- ❖ Schneier, Bruce: Applied Cryptography, Addison-Wesley 1996
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


## WWW Documents

- ❖ K. Felten: An Algorithm for Symmetric Cryptography with a wide range  
of scalability. [www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/crypto\\_01.pdf](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/crypto_01.pdf).
- ❖ K. Felten: Abstract: An Algorithm for Symmetric Cryptography ...  
[www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/abstract.pdf](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/abstract.pdf).
- ❖ Test-program crypt.exe for PC with Intel-CPU:  
[www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/crypt.exe](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/crypt.exe)
- ❖ C++ Source code and header-file for random-number generators  
random1 and random2:  
[www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/ranclass3.cpp](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/ranclass3.cpp)  
[www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/ranclass3.h](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/iws2003/ranclass3.h)

## WWW Links

- ❖ Felten's Homepage:  
[www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/](http://www.e-technik.fh-kiel.de/~felten/)

 **current hints**  **Cryptography Documents**